India has joined a few countries in asserting it will not recognise a government established in Afghanistan by force.

The expression “by force” makes it clear India is against recognising a Taliban dispensation in Kabul established by "outright military victory” which appears to be a fait accompli now.

The US, UK and EU have taken a similar stand with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken even threatening to reduce the Taliban government to a global pariah.

This sound and fury makes little sense when the US seeks Taliban assurance for the safety of its embassy, meaning they all along expected the mullahs to take control of Kabul sooner than earlier expected.

It will be no surprise to expect a secret US deal with the Taliban, a quid pro quo that Washington will push for a power sharing arrangement but still deal with the Taliban, if they don't shelter Al Qaida and such anti-US terror groups that they fear may launch attacks on American soil.

Or else why would the US suspend its “armed overwatch” for the Afghan army and cease air strikes on advancing Taliban forces? The rapid fall of the provincial capitals and key cities like Herat, Ghazni and Kandahar happened after the “armed overwatch” stopped. Now Kabul has fallen.

Such a possible covert deal by the US would not be much different than the one China tried striking with the Taliban when Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted their high power delegation recently. Wang recognized the Taliban as the major political and military force in Afghanistan but warned them not to shelter, arm or train the Uighur separatists of Xinjiang.

It will be no surprise if the Russians and Iranians strike similar deals - recognition of the Taliban regime will be linked to a promise not to support Chechens or Sunni militias like Pakistan-based Jundallah.

Nations conduct foreign policy less on great humanitarian principles and more in pursuit of their own self-interest. Big powers, all the more. India has totally misread the ground reality in Afghanistan by expecting the Ghani government to survive despite the US military withdrawal.

That explains its continued moral (possibly also material) support for a corrupt dispensation that had no will to fight and fled with stashed millions as the Taliban closed in on Kabul. Contrast this to former communist leader Najibullah who held out for three years after the Russians left. Recall the 1989 battle of Jalalabad where the Afghan forces withstood a Pakistan backed siege so bravely.

India's ties with those in the present government and the warlords backing them dates back to days after the Soviet withdrawal. India even dispatched military advisers to support guerrilla commander

Ahmad Shah Massoud before the Taliban takeover in 1996. There is no reason India should dump its long-term friends in Afghanistan - or anywhere else in the neighborhood. But that should not include the corrupt Ghani clique.

The challenge for Indian diplomacy now is to find a way to deal with the reality on ground in Afghanistan. If India can maintain a stoic silence over the February 1 military takeover in Myanmar and deal with the junta there, why can't it deal with the Taliban regime established through force?

India could covertly take care of providing safe third-country shelter to its Afghan friends like Vice President Amrullah Saleh and find some way to covertly supply those still willing to fight on. The Tajik and Uzbek warlords could find trans-border shelter for themselves in the neighbouring Central Asian Republics, using their ethnic ties. Supporting them with funds and supplies would be difficult, but not impossible.

But Delhi and its foreign policy mandarins must realise it would be impossible to ensure a diplomatic isolation of the Taliban, so long as China, Russia, Pakistan, even Iran deal with it to further economic and political interests.

So if India can deal with the Burmese military regime established and sustained by brazen force, why can't it deal with the Taliban and secure an useful quid pro quo. The Taliban government, about to be established, should be asked to recognise Kashmir as an internal problem of India. In return, India should agree to complete all the development and infrastructure projects which are immensely popular with Afghans.

The present hands-off on these projects will only lead to Jack crying over spilt milk - rather over the nearly $3 billion sunk in the 500-plus projects, which are quite popular with the Afghans. The ability to continue these projects in a Taliban-run Afghanistan will help India maintain a limited presence and possible gains in the future. In fact, Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen has expressed “deep appreciation” for India's capacity-building development projects but only warned Delhi against providing military backing to the Ghani government.

The present Taliban is not just a bunch of madrassa-educated mullahs. Once military victory is achieved, they don't stand much to gain from Pakistan, which is an economic basket case. They would need the backing of big economies, India included, to run and develop a reasonable economy minus drugs. Pitching for an Afghan-driven solution is fine - let's wait for Afghan nationalists within the Taliban to assert themselves.

Meanwhile, India should liberally offer resettlement to Afghans, including under-training Afghan soldiers, who wish to settle in India and not return to Afghanistan. If India can have Gorkha regiments with Nepalese citizens and a Special Frontier Force with Tibetan exiles, a quietly-raised Afghan regiment is an investment for the future.

As an emerging power, India has to learn to hunt with the hound and swim with the crocodile, as all Great Powers do. If China can arm the Arakan Army and still have the Myanmar army in its grip, India should be able to take care of its Afghan friends and still deal with the Taliban.

If the Afghan Taliban is seen in Delhi as a Pakistani proxy, the Burmese military regime is no less a Chinese surrogate. In such a situation, getting the best out of the worst should be the sole policy consideration for India now.

Subir Bhaumik, a former BBC and Reuters correspondent, is author of five books on South Asian conflicts.

The views expressed are those of the author.