As the second anniversary of the Myanmar military coup on 1 February falls upon us, the military junta or State Administration Council (SAC) is determined to hold a national election in the second half of the year in the hope of achieving legitimacy, while the ethnic-democratic forces under the Spring Revolution will be looking to heighten collaboration in the face of a common enemy. 

Time flies. Two years have past since the generals wrested control from the democratically-elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party, briefly lined up to take up power by the November 2020 election. This, therefore, is an opportune time to take stock. 

In this respect a virtual discussion held recently by the Stimson Center entitled “Outlook of Myanmar’s Resistance Movement in 2023”, including the participation of Christina Fink and Ye Myo Hein, is worth mentioning, particularly because the proposition dwells on how to improve the overall undertaking of the ethnic-democratic forces’ capability and solidarity to hammer out better coordination and cooperation amongst the resistance players. 

After all, the success or failure of the Spring Revolution could well pivot on this crucial issue.  

Christina Fink, an analyst of Myanmar issues, in analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the current revolutionary movement said that the National Unity Government (NUG) is more successful than the revolutionary forces of the past in raising funds for war victims. The revolutionary forces also can now undertake whatever they want without relying on external support. 

Although the anti-dictatorship armed movement only took place in non-Bamar ethnic states in the past, this time around it has spread to the majority Bamar areas, and it can be argued that the Military Council is losing control in one region after another, forced to spread a reign of fear through the burning of villages and the massacre of villagers.  

As Fink notes, the military now treats the civilian population as the enemy. This reflects the fact that the military really does not know how to deal with this.  

Emergence of PDF forces 

Fink pointed out the challenges as the Spring Revolution players attempt to work together and the resulting changes in junta military tactics. 

“One challenge is that the Military Council may increase airstrikes. Twenty years ago, they didn’t have the ability to do this. They have bought fighter jets from Russia and China. They also received military training. At the moment, when the Military Council’s ground forces are quite weak, they use more airstrikes. In addition, they know that there is almost no support for them among the people, so morale is also declining. But the army is making the best use of the air force’s capabilities. One of the things they are doing is launching airstrikes on the headquarters of the ethnic armed groups that provide military training to the People’s Defense Force (PDF) troops. In this way, they are trying to separate Bamar revolutionary groups from ethnic groups,” she said. 

“Another challenge is that there is some authoritarianism among both civilian and ethnic leaders, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) party. Thus, it is very difficult to organize all groups under one leadership. Therefore, it would be more practical for all revolutionary groups to stand as a network connected to each other rather than as a single group. From here, we can gradually improve cooperation,” Fink notes. 

She also considers it important for the Bamar leaders to understand the wishes of the ethnic groups in order to build trust with the ethnic leaders. 

“The peace process started in 2010, but the NLD was not allowed to participate. During the period when the NLD came to power, their performance was not good. They do not understand the needs of the ethnic groups and the relationship between ethnic groups. It is also because the NLD party did not choose the person whom the ethnic parties wanted to appoint as the state chief minister. Only ethnic members from the NLD party are appointed to these positions, so it remains under the control of the NLD. So, in the ethnic states, especially in Rakhine and Shan states, trust is destroyed. Therefore, in order to build trust with the ethnic groups both militarily and politically, as the forces active in the cause of democracy, we need to overcome not only past actions, but also the mistrust caused by recent actions,” Fink said. 

She echoed the call of a US diplomat. As Scott Marciel, the former US ambassador to Myanmar, said in an interview, currently, the revolutionary forces need to develop a road map.  

This is a refrain heard from a number of experts. Now, there is a need for a road map that is accepted by all, to ensure that the various armed resistance groups’ activities are coordinated and that they are moving toward the same goal of becoming a stable and peaceful country in the future. 

Political analyst on Myanmar Ye Myo Hein of Woodrow Wilson Center suggested that only through trust-building, cooperation and coordination can the current political crisis be overcome.  

“Right now, it is important to have cooperation between the revolutionary forces. According to the history of Myanmar, it is unrealistic to expect perfect unity. Therefore, as revolutionary forces, we must build a plan step-by-step.” 

Ye Myo Hein also emphasized that the NUG in cooperation with the ethnic armed forces were able to set up five military regions across Myanmar, creating and establishing Central Command and Coordination Committees (C3C), Joint Command and Coordination (J2C) and the Alliance Relation Committee, in order to improve the relationship between the newly-established PDF groups and the existing ethnic armed groups. 

Success with this is crucially important for the Spring Revolution.  

Conditions needed to win 

Two years in and the key elements needed for success are emerging from the fog of war.  

According to “Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements,” by James DeFronzo, five conditions for a successful revolution are listed as follows: mass frustration resulting in local uprisings; dissident elites; powerful unifying motivations; a severe crisis paralyzing state administrative & coercive powers; and a permissive or tolerant world context. 

The Burma or Myanmar situation actually meets all the conditions mentioned above for a successful revolution. 

For example, there is mass frustration leading to local uprising because the military staged a coup and took away the people’s partial democratic rights that they enjoyed from 2011 to 2021, which is intolerably breaching their freedom and thus met with the countrywide resistance. There is more than enough dissident elites joining the revolution. The powerful unifying motivations are to uproot the military dictatorship, including all forms of autocratic rules, and unwavering aspirations to rebuild the country within the frame of federal democratic union. 

A severe crisis paralyzing state administrative and coercive powers can be seen by countrywide anti-coup demonstrations and later armed resistance that transformed into nationwide civil war and the military inability to rule as more than 50 percent of the country’s territories are under the control of ethnic-democratic forces. According to Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), the junta can only claim to have stable control over 17 percent of the country, as its rule is being actively contested elsewhere. 

A permissive or tolerant world context is also the prevailing atmosphere, because the neighbouring countries and even the ASEAN cannot do anything to defuse the ongoing civil war and seems unwilling to take the sides of the two conflict parties, the military junta and the ethnic-democratic forces, which can either be taken as being impotent, indifferent, or tolerant to the revolutionary movement. 

In sum, it may be seen as favorable conditions for a successful revolution as outlined by James DeFronzo. 

Moves to be undertaken 

Nevertheless, even if the Spring Revolution may have grown with leaps and bounds in less than two years it is still quite far away from immediate victory for several reasons. 

In general terms political unity and military cohesion still need to be solidify and important nuts and bolts have to be in place first. 

In a practical sense political unity actually can only be achieved by resolving the constitutional crisis which has plagued the country from the outset since the country’s independence from the British in 1948. 

Problems from the past 

To make a long story short, the Bamar political class has never honoured the 1947 Panglong Agreement, which is the sole legal bond between the Bamar and the non-Bamar ethnic nationalities. They have rejected the non-Bamar ethnic nationalities’ 1961 federal amendment proposal, popularly known as the Shan Federal Proposal, of the 1948 Union of Burma Constitution to make it more federal, as it was only federal in structure but unitary in essence. And there has been a steadfast rejection of ethnic equality, democracy, federalism and human rights by successive Bamar military leaders and the Bamar civilian political class.  

Thus in order to win over the remaining EAOs, the NUG and its ethnic allies may need to produce a federal democratic union constitution and not just the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC), which is just the guidelines and not a constitution. For the non-Bamar ethnic nationalities this has to be in place first or agreed upon first before committing themselves to war-time coalition-building. In other words, the transformation of the FDC to a federal democratic union constitution has to be speeded up, without delay, as no decisive move from the part of the remaining EAOs will happen if the constitution is not in place. 

Sure, it is a step-by-step process. But constitutional drafting, which at least should include agreed core principles, will have to be given priority so that a speedy political unity and expansion of a military alliance between the NUG and EAOs can gain momentum. 

To sum up, the achievement of political unity of the Spring Revolution depends upon an agreeable constitution of all stakeholders, which in turn will pave the way for the further development of military coordination and cooperation, even if this does not lie under one command.