One year removed from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and two since the coup in Myanmar, the paths of the two ostracized regimes continue to converge. They are paths born of similar faults and paths that once taken show no sign of an off ramp. In hindsight, would either Vladimir Putin or Min Aung Hlaing have launched their troubled miliary putsches if they could have foreseen the calamitous results? We may never know. But we can conclude that neither anticipated the extent of the fallout from their actions.
The failure of Russian intelligence to anticipate the reaction of Ukraine, and its allies, to the Russian invasion shares some similarities to the failure of the Myanmar military to anticipate the full extent of opposition to its coup. And this points to deficiencies in the intelligence sectors of both countries well prior to the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and February 2021 coup in Myanmar.
“The Department of Operational Information (also known as the 5th Service of the FSB) performs the functions of foreign intelligence of the FSB,” writes investigative journalist Liubov Velychko in the recently published article 30 talking points about Ukraine: Why the FSB failed the ‘ideological prelude’ of the invasion of Ukraine. “Since its establishment in 1998, the department has always singled out Ukraine among all post-Soviet countries, trying to keep it in its sphere of influence.” Thus, a principal aim of post-Cold War Russian intelligence was to ensure Russian interests were not prohibitively challenged in Ukraine.
Velychko continues by stating that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), had for years been feeding President Putin what it imagined the Russian leader wanted to hear – namely the ease with which Kiev would fall and the support of many Ukrainians for Russian “liberation”. This should not come as a surprise. Intelligence communities, and not only in authoritarian regimes, frequently serve to reinforce rather than correct biases. This can be seen in Hitler’s conviction that the D-Day invasion force would land at Calais, or in Tony Blair and George W. Bush’s certainty that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.
FSB operations in Ukraine were also riddled with corruption. Following the detention of the head of the 5th Service of the FSB and his deputy, again according to Velychko, media named the reasons for their fall from grace as a misuse of funds allocated for special operations in Ukraine as well as poor intelligence information.
Looking at Myanmar, following the mass protests of 1988 a primary role of the intelligence community was to ensure the military never again had to face a similar challenge to its privileged position in society. But the intelligence network in Myanmar has never recovered from the ousting of Khin Nyunt in 2004 and the dismantling of his apparatus. This, despite a decade of focus, following the reforms initiated in 2011, on growing intelligence capacity under the Tatmadaw and Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing. “By the time of Aung San Suu Kyi,” writes Myanmar armed forces expert Andrew Selth in Secrets and Power in Myanmar, “almost all aspects of intelligence were answerable, directly or indirectly, to Min Aung Hlaing.”
This personal relationship with the state’s intelligence apparatus is one possible reason Min Aung Hlaing felt confident in launching his coup and in the assessments of his intelligence agents. But the system suffered from similar shortcomings to that of the FSB, namely corruption, feeding information based on erroneous assumptions and a penchant to favor personal loyalty and political reliability.
Militarily, both the Russian and Myanmar armed forces, once feared outfits with generously projected power potential, have punched well below pre-conflict assessments. And this is also at least partly a function of poor intelligence. Uninspired and inadequately provisioned forces are many times the norm. While corruption over the years has served to undercut the aims of military modernization programs in each country. The result, as seen in Ukraine and Myanmar, are much less capable fighting forces than previously anticipated.
Having met stiffer resistance than expected, and facing the distinct possibility of defeat, both Russian and Myanmar intelligence communities are scrambling to make amends. A common tactic is the spread of misinformation and false flag actions.
One example well documented in Velychko’s article is the alleged preparation by Ukraine to employ a dirty bomb. The dirty bomb scare “was aimed primarily at the Russian audience,” contends Velychko. “This jumpscare was supposed to be an argument why Russia should continue to fight with Ukraine.” It was, in other words, supposed to stoke anxiety and fear among Russians.
Turning to Myanmar, the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA) has a lengthy history since its founding in 2004/05 of false flag actions and fabrications aimed at stoking racial, religious, and communal animosities. This has even extended to the planting of bombs in population centers to cause confusion and provoke fears. In the current conflict, such activities are aimed at justifying the military’s actions and galvanizing public support.
These trends in misinformation and false flag actions highlight the importance for Ukrainian and Myanmar opposition forces in having a mechanism in place for a timely and transparent response announced at the highest level possible to deny, and ideally disprove, the false allegations and actions of Moscow and Nay Pyi Taw.
Having launched their countries down extravagantly damaging paths, is there any chance of an about face from either quarter? It seems unlikely. Neither Vladimir Putin nor Min Aung Hlaing can afford to step back from the precipice. Both will view victory as the only guarantee of their personal security and privileged status. And the burgeoning relationship between Moscow and Nay Pyi Taw is likely only to further blossom as both sides have little other choice.
Nay Pyi Taw looks to Moscow for diplomatic protection, arms, and foreign investment. While Moscow seeks a market for its energy (and dwindling military surplus) along with a foothold in a strategically important region of the world. Countries aligned with the anti-junta opposition in Myanmar, many of which share pro-Ukrainian positions, have racketed up the sanction regime against both Moscow and Nay Pyi Taw. However, while these measures can meet with some success at the bilateral level, they are unlikely to dissuade the growing bonds between Moscow and Nay Pyi Taw.
But to return to our original query, would a true appreciation of the intelligence deficits have altered the mindsets of either Vladimir Putin or Min Aung Hlaing? It is just possible that both figures harbor such disdain for their political opponents, either domestic or international, that an inspired resistance, let alone collective resistance, to their aggressions was simply unfathomable.
