Many Indian citizens will find it hard to forget the horrific video footage on the news and social media of Indian and Chinese soldiers in deadly hand-to-hand combat in June 2020 in Galwan Valley on the Roof of the World, a clash that resulted in 20 Indian soldiers being beaten to death with spiked cudgels.

The bloody clash on the Ladakh border with China – which blew up on social media - proved a serious low-point in India-China relations and a stark reminder that border disputes remain a serious challenge, souring what is otherwise a more mature political and economic relationship between these major powers.

This border standoff is the focus of a newly released International Crisis Group report, entitled, “Thin Ice in the Himalayas: Handling the India-China Border Dispute”.

As Crisis Group's Senior China Analyst and co-author Amanda Hsiao notes:

"The 2020 border clashes showed us that China projects its strategic anxieties onto Indian assertions along their disputed border. Faced with pressures from the U.S., Beijing miscalculated that a significant show of force could quell what it viewed as provocations from an emboldened New Delhi. The potential for strategic distrust to spill over onto the territorial dispute remains.”

Crisis Group's Senior India Analyst and co-author Praveen Donthi notes:

"Around 50,000 troops remain deployed on each side of the India-China border for a fourth consecutive winter. Twenty rounds of high-level military talks have fallen short of thawing relations between Asia's two giants, making the increasingly militarised border unpredictable and the threat of renewed clashes high. China and India should hedge against risks by creating extra buffer zones in areas with regular standoffs, while building on existing border protocols, particularly the ban on firearms.”

Donthi says the Sino-Indian relationship has hit its lowest point since the border war of 1962. With geopolitical tensions and heightened nationalism in both countries, the next decade looks ominous for the bilateral relationship.

BONE OF CONTENTION

The deadly clash on the India-China frontier in 2020 has caused a fundamental shift in relations between the two Asian giants, the report notes. Anxieties arising from competition for influence in South Asia and globally have spilled over into their border dispute, fuelling military build-ups and heightening the risk of fresh fighting.

What is unfortunate is that “nationalist” governments – under China’s Xi Jinping and India’s Narendra Modi - are hardening their stance on the border dispute. The lack of clarity as to where the line lies means that hostile encounters are bound to recur, potentially even leading to interstate conflict, with far-reaching consequences for regional and global security.

While resolution of the dispute remains elusive, China and India should hedge against risks by creating more buffer zones between their armies and strengthening crisis management mechanisms. The two sides should also resume regular political dialogue to modulate the developing rivalry in their relationship.

TROUBLED FRONTIER

The border dispute between India and China has again become a thorn in the two Asian giants ’sides. Rival claims as to where the frontier lies first flared into war in 1962, poisoning relations until a slow rapprochement began in the 1980s. Built on a willingness to set aside the quarrel given other shared interests, the precarious peace wobbled as China surged economically and militarily. Intensifying competition fuelled nationalism in both countries as well as fear of losing territory and status.

A fierce round of fighting in 2020, the first in many years, seriously damaged Sino-Indian ties. A resolution of the dispute appears unlikely, but New Delhi and Beijing should explore how they can assure mutual security along a heavily militarised frontier and mitigate the risk of skirmishes escalating into full-blown clashes. They should establish extra buffer zones in well-known contested areas and build on existing border protocols, particularly the ban on firearms. Most importantly, they should return to more regular dialogue at the highest levels, the best way to manage the distrust between them.

THE 1962 SHOCK

Since the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India established relations in 1950, the importance of the border dispute to broader ties has ebbed and flowed. The India-China boundary runs

along the Himalayas, with the discrepancy in claims starkest at the range’s two ends. To the west, China controls 38,000 sq km of territory that New Delhi also claims; to the east, India holds 90,000 sq km that Beijing says belongs to China.

The 1962 war, which saw more than 7,000 Indian soldiers killed or captured, represented a victory for Beijing and a chastening experience for New Delhi. Its legacy reverberates today. Ever since, India has been leery of China’s intentions, while China has been convinced that occasional shows of punitive force are necessary to deter Indian territorial ambitions.

Despite high tensions and occasional altercations, the countries made strides toward keeping the peace. The two governments engineered a détente in 1988, agreeing to delink the boundary issue from their overall bilateral relationship and work toward its political solution. Over the two decades that followed, they agreed on measures to maintain the status quo, a working boundary called the Line of Actual Control (LAC), protocols to reduce the risk of escalation and limits on garrisons along that line. But obstacles in the way of an agreed-upon border also became stark.

DISCREPANCIES

Clarifying the status quo, or where the LAC lies, proved a huge challenge. Moreover, as Chinese confidence and ambition grew in the late 2000s Beijing hardened its position on the question. Hostile encounters between troops increased in tempo.

Frictions continued to rise under President Xi and Prime Minister Modi, both nationalists who see their political reputations as intimately connected to sovereign assertiveness and power projection abroad. Growing rivalry between the two big powers magnified the fears of each about the other’s actions along their main shared flashpoint. Deepening security cooperation between the U.S. and India made China uneasy; China’s growing political, economic and military clout in India’s neighbourhood, as well as its evergreen support for Pakistan, jangled nerves in India.

MESSY ENCOUNTERS

The mutual suspicion soon saw border incidents resurface, in 2013, 2014 and 2017. The 73-day standoff in 2017 at Doklam, a strategic location at the trijunction where India, China and Bhutan meet, appeared to mark a new low, with Indian and Chinese troops forming human chains to stare each other down.

Soon thereafter, Beijing ventured a display of force, miscalculating that it could discipline what it perceived to be India’s bolder approach on the border. In 2020, thousands of Chinese troops advanced in different locations at the west of the border, triggering clashes with Indian soldiers. Twenty Indians and at least four Chinese died in combat, many in hand-to-hand fighting with crude weapons.

The border seems to have stabilised in the last three years, but dangers remain. The two sides have established buffer zones in areas where standoffs occurred in 2020. They have, however, also fortified their positions with fresh troops, who now number over 100,000 (counting those on both sides), and infrastructure. Roads and settlements on the Chinese side in particular mean reinforcements can arrive quickly. The build-ups make clear the cost of escalation, encouraging restraint. Still, the 2020 clashes marked a setback in relations, heightening sensitivities to possible threats along the frontier and suspicions, particularly on the Indian side. India now considers China its primary security threat, above Pakistan, long its core preoccupation. It has deepened cooperation with the U.S. and strengthened ties to other IndoPacific countries in Washington’s orbit, including Japan and Australia. China, by comparison, appears comfortable with the degree of control it has of the border, due to its fortifications. It is more content than India with the larger relationship as well, though distrust remains entrenched.

Without improvements in the tone and substance of the bilateral relationship, the threat of fresh outbreaks of fighting persists. The 2020s will present sterner tests than the last few decades did, due to heightened nationalism on both sides as well as geopolitical tensions. Through existing dialogue mechanisms, the two sides should seek to adapt the principle they agreed upon in 1996 of “mutual and equal security” – namely, military deployments of mutually acceptable size near the border – to the reality of a heavily militarised frontier. They should reaffirm their commitment to and explore how to strengthen protocols meant to prevent escalation at the border, including the ban on firearm usage. They should consider returning to discussions to set up hotlines at top military levels to defuse tensions when they arise and establish more buffer zones along stretches of the frontier that have seen sharp confrontation.

Resuming dialogue between the two leaders – largely frozen since 2019, except for meetings at multilateral summits – is vital to managing distrust. It will be difficult, given New Delhi’s concern that such talks offer legitimacy to Beijing’s characterisation of the border situation as normal. But New Delhi can make clear that reopening communications is intended to manage a competitive relationship and to assert Indian prerogatives – not to paper them over. While political leaders in both states assert the

primacy of national interests, neither country’s security would be served by more fighting between armies bristling with modern weaponry.

KEEPING THE PEACE

The International Crisis Group report notes the border dispute between China and India is a legacy of colonial rule in South Asia that has become a major strand in the emerging major-power rivalry of the 21st century.

As nationalist governments have arisen in India and China over the past decade, each has set great store by sovereign assertiveness and global status. The contested border between the two countries has in turn become a theatre for displays of state power and military prowess.

But shows of national strength have also generated growing fears as to the other side’s intentions, and heightened sensitivity to perceptions that territory or military superiority is under threat.

The deadly combat in eastern Ladakh in 2020 encapsulated these risks, causing grave damage to the bilateral relationship; Sino-Indian ties are now in their deepest trough since the 1962 war. From a combination of competition and cooperation, India and China appear to have returned to a mode of “armed coexistence”, in which each state counts on rival global alliances. Amid mutual distrust, as well as military reinforcements and infrastructure building on both sides, the border remains prone to sudden flare-ups of violence, with consequences that could reach far beyond the region.

Keeping the peace at the border hinges on revitalising the rules of engagement that for decades managed to stop standoffs from escalating into clashes. More and stronger buffer zones, clearer rules on use of firearms and other weapons, and communications channels between the two countries ’top brass can all play a vital role.

A comprehensive agreement to demarcate the border would be ideal, but domestic politics in both countries make this task prohibitively difficult. In the absence of such a deal, political leaders in both countries should seek to complement military protocols with far more fluid high-level engagement. The dispute in the Himalayas is now about strategic competition between the two biggest Asian powers as much as the border’s territorial value itself.

Preventing further fighting depends on ensuring that competition can be handled amicably on the high ground to avoid the brutal scenes captured on smartphone amidst the thin atmosphere on the Roof of the World.

The full report is available from International Crisis Group at www.crisisgroup.org.