In the wake of the Myanmar military coup, Myanmar nationalists and propagandists began to fall foul of Facebook’s community standard controls, finding posts blocked, and even accounts closed.
It was therefore not surprising that those behind the rash of fake, troll or propaganda accounts would turn to TikTok, YouTube, VK, Viber and Telegram where the community standards might be looser and the platforms more open.
Ironically, Telegram – which is supposed to champion the ability to practice free speech – has begun to be a useful tool for a host of Myanmar military and nationalist supporters as they attempt to battle those supporting the Spring Revolution, National Unity Government (NUG), People’s Defence Forces (PDF) and a slew of public personalities seeking freedom and a return to democracy.
Telegram may be a beacon of free thought – needed when there is so much censorship on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube – yet this freedom is being used by those in Myanmar with ill intent.
SUPPORTING THE MILITARY
Military lobbyists and nationalists are now running rampant on Telegram, using the open platform to spread misinformation and attack those in the Spring Revolution.
While Telegram is in no way as popular as Facebook – Facebook essentially equates with the internet in Myanmar – it still has wide and growing outreach in Myanmar.
Various players have been using the social media platform to attempt to keep the military’s State Administration Council (SAC) in power and undermine those who support the Spring Revolution, as well as create divisions in society, stir racism, cause problems between Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO), and seek to defame the pro-democracy revolutionaries.
These channels are distributing information including personal or sexual matters and defamatory posts linking them with aspects of the Spring Revolution.
The aim? To trash the reputation of those in the Spring Revolution and cast doubt over their activities and aims.
On the one hand, the Telegram channels pretend to be a whistleblower of secret internal information, but on the other hand, they make people think they are important military personalities by giving them military-related names before creating or sharing the pro-military content.
On occasion, they impersonate a well-known media personality or presenter and push out propaganda for the SAC, using a stolen image of the media personality.
All this is destabilizing in a society torn apart by the post-coup crisis where people rely on social media for their news and information.
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EXAMPLES OF TROLLS
Take the content shared by the 'Shwe Yupar Oo' Telegram channel. It appears aimed at sparking conflict between Buddhists, Muslims and revolutionaries. The owner of this channel is a well-known social media influencer named 'Shwe Yupar Oo.' She usually posts content to protect the military and attack people who are against the dictatorship. For example, the channel claimed the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a respected international Muslim body, was offering money for the assassination of a Buddhist monk.
Shwe Yupar Oo sought a place on Telegram after her pages were removed from Facebook. This Telegram channel gained over 4,000 subscribers as soon as it opened. The subscriber tally is now over 10,000. It is currently uploading at least five posts a day.
Due to what amounts to bogus content, it is not surprising that military supporters post comments against the National League for Democracy (NLD) party - usually referred to as the “Red” - and the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) with calls to launch military operations against those they claim are insulting Buddhism.
This angry mix feeds off the false propaganda long pumped out by the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and nationalists that claims the NLD “loves Muslims” and is threatening the majority Buddhist population by encouraging Muslim population growth.
In addition, those posting comments often use the term ‘Wat Ma Sar’ (a person who abstains from eating pork) to refer to Muslim people indirectly. This term became popular among military supporters, and they use it broadly when they want to target or attack Muslims.
SEXUAL CONTENT
Channels and groups with the name ‘Han Nyein Oo’ on Telegram initially attracted an audience by sharing leaked naked photos or sexual videos of women who they claim oppose the junta.
Typically, the material is leaked without consent or is photoshopped.
While pornographic content goes against Telegram’s terms of service, the platform sees a flurry of such material.
Later, the ‘Han Nyein Oo’ channels pivoted to running pro-military posts, disinformation posts, and hate speech posts based on religion and race. Also, it shared inspirational posts or writings to target and crack down on the PDF and anti-junta people.
Sexy photos and videos drew in an audience. Now propaganda is interspersed with the spice. Currently, there are more than 10 channels and groups on Telegram under the ‘Han Nyein Oo’ name.
RAPE AND MURDER
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As an example, a ‘Han Nyein Oo’ channel sought to hype up the rape and murder allegedly carried out by an anonymous group against two women who it was alleged were military informers.
The murders were reported by both Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and Khit Thit media on their channels without confirming who was responsible.
The ‘Han Nyein Oo’ channel published gory and explicit photos of the dead body of one of the women claiming the PDF were involved, aiming to stir up hatred against the resistance groups.
In a separate case, the PDF came under attack for allegedly murdering a teacher who was said not to be part of the CDM movement. Again, although there was no proof of the allegation, the incident was used to inflame the situation.
SLANDERING THE CDM
A channel named ‘Tat Kyat Gyi Phoe Si’ has stigmatized health issues and what they claim is the inadequate care of a mother and her children, blaming it on the health workers who left their posts to join the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).
To incite people, a photo of two infants was used and the post claimed both the mother and children died because doctors and nurses had fled their posts to join the CDM, alleging they were unable to get treatment. These Telegram posts reached more than 3,400 viewers.
INDEPENDENT MEDIA UNDER ATTACK
It is natural, of course, that a number of these Telegram channels would take aim at the independent media that has stepped in post-coup to attempt to supply reliable news and information on Myanmar in this time of crisis.
These Telegram channels not only attack the independent media but also frequently post content that seek to undermine the Spring Revolution and incite hatred based on race and religion. Furthermore, they also live-stream to meet and communicate with their supporters. They are frequently carrying out group activities and inter-channel post sharing and uploading.
There is a clear divide between media groups who had their license removed by the junta such as DVB and Mizzima and the media that sought to remain in place and toe the junta line.
It is not surprising that these nationalist Telegram channels seek to attack independent media and spread misinformation.
Attack posts are at times ludicrous in their claims. Independent media are often attacked for accepting dollars from international donors or accepting money from Islamic organizations.
Military propaganda channels – effectively a crutch for the junta – use established media to spread fake news. Some channels such as ‘Myanmar Hard Talk’ and ‘Myanmar National Post’ attack the people’s trusted independent media. These channels also gave the title “Media Jihad” to the non-military media claiming the media does not report the murder of monks but only about the murder of Muslims and the destruction of mosques. Jihad is a Muslim term for struggle or fight.
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At the beginning of the Spring Revolution, the Myanmar National Post pushed a misleading narrative that the protestors were violent, and that only the media on the junta’s side could be trusted. At one point, in December 2021, they accused arrested journalists involved in a strike in Kyimyindaing Township of being terrorists.
Such channels push misinformation. ‘Myanmar Hard Talk’ hosted by ‘Aung Min’, who claims to be a freelance photojournalist, posted content on 2 October alleging that nine innocent civilians were killed because of instructions from a DVB journalist in Baw Pyin Village, in Gangaw Township. Again, there was also more content in November and December accusing DVB of being a media outlet that is using fake news to destroy the country.
The Facebook page of Myanmar Hard Talk hosted by Aung Min was removed, allegedly due to the sharing of fake news, disinformation and hate speech before the election.
JUNTA PROPAGANDA MOVEMENT
Myanmar nationalist social media propaganda is nothing new. Even before the 2021 coup, Buddhist monk Wirathu and his supporters used social media and racist hate speech to rile up the masses.
Amidst the Wild West of Myanmar and international social media, it is not surprising that a plethora of social media accounts – both genuine and fake – have popped up. A number of accounts are said to be run by individual users.
On Telegram, some pro-military channels are uploading posts with several topics or types of content every day. For example, ‘Thazin Oo’, ‘Han Nyein Oo’, ‘Kyaw Swar’, and ‘Tat Kyat Gyi Phoe Si’ are all among the currently popular channels. Given the amount of posts, it appears many people – not a few individuals – are running these accounts.
Some private channels such as ‘Shwe Yupar Oo’ and ‘Phyo Wai’ only post around five to ten times a day.
However, ‘The Myanmar National Post’ channel sometimes posts more than 200 times in a day. It is obviously the collective efforts of Naung Taw Lay’ and his partners behind that channel.
The most popular channel among the SAC supporters is ‘Han Nyein Oo’ whose daily reach has grown to about 1.4 million. It has an even larger reach than this as posts are also forwarded more than 8,000 times. Social network users have reported this channel to Telegram calling for its removal. However, the number of propaganda channels on Telegram is increasing due to the lack of response to complaints.
How directly these pro-junta channels are linked to the SAC is unclear. But channels controlled by the SAC reuse the contents of pro junta channels on occasion.
THE DANGER
The message is clear – Myanmar social media users need to be careful about the media they consume and be aware that there are a host of accounts – particularly on Telegram – that seek to attack democracy and the Spring Revolution activists through the propagation of twisted and often false content.
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The hand of the SAC can be seen in this propaganda drive.
Telegram, as mentioned, is often used by individuals and groups who have trouble posting or keeping accounts on Facebook and other platforms.
All this poses a danger for Myanmar democracy activists and the Spring Revolution.
