Making sense of Burma's new capital

by Mizzima News

Friday, 26 June 2009 18:39

Title: Naypyidaw – The New Capital of Burma Author: Dulyapak Preecharushh Publisher: White Lotus, Bangkok, 2009, 181  p. Price: 650 baht ($US 19) Reviewed by: Joseph Ball   Capitals move. And capitals often move, as in the case of Burma's generals uprooting the country's administrative center from Rangoon to Naypyidaw, for quite rational and sensible reasons. This, in a nutshell, is the argument put forth by Dulyapak Preecharushh in Naypyidaw – The New Capital of Burma.   While many of the motivations ascribed to the move will not be new to readers, this contribution does add depth to the relevant arguments, presenting the construction of an altogether new city in the country's hinterland as a natural outcropping stemming from the infusion of a range of perceived motivations not dissimilar to what transpired last century in Turkey, Brazil and Nigeria.   "The new capital will offer every advantage to the ruling government in terms of politico-military security, inland economic development and spiritual-cultural unity," contends the author.   The move to Naypyidaw, some 320 kilometers north of Rangoon and the fourteenth relocation dating from the change in capitals from Bagan to Toungoo in 1486, is not without precedent in the annals of Burmese kingship and governance. As Dulyapak notes, "modern strategic threats" are said to have contributed to King Mindon's decision to relocate the capital from Amarapura to Mandalay in 1857.   Regarding the November 2005 move from the old capital, the author at least partially contributes the decision to a reorientation of security sector interests in both combating a potential external enemy, defined as a sea-borne American-led assault, and an internal enemy, defined as restive ethnic minority populations – specifically the Shan, Karen and Karenni, whose geographic population centers each lie in close proximity to the new administrative center.   Proof in the effectiveness of the move in the realm of national and regime security is found in both the 2007 Saffron Revolution and the aftermath of the following year's deadly Cyclone Nargis. With respect to the former, the author contends the relocation of the capital allowed the junta to systematically crush the uprising while confronted with minimal direct threat to the regime itself. Meanwhile, without having relocated the capital, it is said the regime never could have continued to focus on other functions and interests of the state – specifically the May 2008 Constitutional Referendum – in the wake of the destruction wrought by Nargis.   The creation of Naypyidaw has, so the final assessment relates, established a de facto dual-power structure which, going forward, is estimated will dominate Burmese politics and security concerns. Devotion to a vertical power structure, centered on Naypyidaw, is depicted as simultaneously existing and contending with a horizontal power structure epitomized by Burmese society in Rangoon and dominated by a fear of Western influence and invasion along the country's coastal territories. While locating the capital in Rangoon was "logical for an outward-looking, export-oriented colonial administration," for post-colonial Burma – and especially in the case of a paranoid, extremely nationalistic military government, Rangoon is a foreign city dominated by foreign influence.   Greatly assisting in arguing for the move, and in direct contrast to a view consistent among the country's political opposition, the government is said to view the central dry zone as the economic hub of the country, and not Rangoon.   The decision not to erect the new capital at the country's true core, determined to be around Kyaukse District – further to the north in Mandalay Division and also the native home of Senior General Than Shwe, is attributed largely to the regime's growing interest in hydroelectric projects more prevalent in the Upper Sittang Valley.   In addition to being conducive for hydroelectric and agricultural development, Naypyidaw is envisioned as being a natural transportation crossroads of a future Burmese state, regarding both domestic and international traffic. With Mandalay set to grow in economic importance and a locus of inland trade – especially from China – the new capital is said to exist strategically between the two competing urban poles of Mandalay and Rangoon. Further, Naypyidaw can be seen to be at the Burmese epicenter of the envisioned Asian Highway Network. However, having personally seen the Asian Highway peter out only a few kilometers into Burma from Thailand, much will first have to happen if Naypyidaw's true geographic relevance as an international transportation hub is ever to be realized. The final principle criteria and justification for the move, according to Dulyapak, relates to Buddhism and Burmese culture. In fact, the author speculates "Naypyidaw has good chance to become a spiritual center," the view of pagodas from office windows set to inspire bureaucrats to fulfill their duties to the state.   "Spiritual and cultural purification has become a political project of the ruling regime that is intrinsically tied in with the quest for cultural unity and national security," assesses the author, referencing an old Buddhist prophecy which foretells that the most powerful king will leave the old capital and construct a new one.   "Moving the capital, which is a symbol of historical pride and cultural heritage," the analysis further sets out, "was an important manifestation of the policy of escaping from the volatile outside world and preserving their own cultural identity."   Even the Khmer Rouge, rulers of today's Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, who nearly succeeded in ridding the state in its entirety of its monastic institutions and religious heritage, maintained the 12th century Angkor Wat prominently at the center of the country's flag.   As today's Tatmadaw, the 400,000 strong Burmese armed forces, becomes increasingly dominated by troops from a rural, Burman and Buddhist background, the security, hinterland and religious/cultural justifications argued for in the capital's move are provided even additional merit.   Yet, lest the wrong impression be given, it should also be mentioned that Dulyapak makes sure to acknowledge that the military government still has much to do if it is actually to tap into the "real root of national culture" – foremost of which is said to be focusing on the needs of the Burmese people themselves, the true foundation of Burmese culture.   The volume, however, is not without some questions, such as the use of "Burma" on the cover and "Myanmar" throughout the text. Or, more strikingly, a summary of 2007's Saffron Revolution stating the demonstrations were comprised of "monks and extremely poor people." Having shared the streets with the protesters, the demographic breakdown was significantly more complicated than what Dulyapak infers. Lastly, while an author is certainly entitled to his or her opinion, postulations such as referring to the construction of Naypyidaw edifices as "a harmonious blend of modern design and Burmese superstitious beliefs" come across as a bit over the top. Yet, the volume is ultimately a welcome contribution to the study of Burma and in particular the reason for Naypyidaw. Too often the actions of Burma's ruling generals are automatically equated with the world of the inane, archaic and whimsical. In attempting to discover and understand why the junta may have thought the move a rational endeavor, the author provides an even bigger and more general lesson for persons interested in Burma's prolonged political impasse – the importance of trying to understand the other side and the reasons for their actions. What does it mean to be modern? The question continues to haunt the Burmese state. As Dulyapak rightly asserts, Naypyidaw is emblematic of the "re-emergence of historical legacy in the modern context." While turning to the past for legitimacy in the realms of the spiritual and cultural, the Burmese regime is concurrently looking to the future in matters related to national security. As such, the relocation of the Burmese administrative capital from Rangoon to Naypyidaw is very much the regime's attempt to marry the traditional with the modern. But can the marriage be made to work? < Prev   Next >